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The higher education system is strongly influenced by perceptions of university prestige 
(selectivity) and rankings. However, increasing selectivity has an adverse impact on university 
racial and economic diversity. Despite this negative impact, universities succumb to isomorphic 
pressures, mimicking the methods of higher ranking universities by attempting to increase the 
selectivity of incoming cohorts. This study aimed to establish the presence and function of 
isomorphic pressures on Council of Public Liberal Art Colleges (COPLAC) member universities 
and the extent to which those pressures impact selectivity and diversity, in comparison to state 
flagships, over time using longitudinal IPEDS data and original survey data. The analyses 
determined COPLACs are experiencing isomorphic pressures. COPLACs are becoming like 
state flagships in terms of Black, Hispanic, and underrepresented racial minority enrollments. 
However, COPLACs are serving more low-income students than state flagships. Overall, 
increasing selectivity does decrease racial minority and low-income enrollments at COPLAC and 
state flagship.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Universities are highly bureaucratic institutions with specific goals, some of which are 
central to the organization while others are peripheral. Over the last few decades, it seems the 
central goal of universities has been to increase their prestige and position in the higher 
education hierarchy (Hazelkorn 2015; Astin 1985; Milem 2003; Hurtado 1992; Morphew and 
Huisman 2002). On the other hand, diversity has long been an important, but peripheral goal to 
universities1 (Hurtado 1992; Milem 2003; Haycock, Lynch, and Engle 2010). The failure of 
universities to make diversity a central goal, while holding increasing university prestige, in 
particular, as a central goal, has led to a lack of diversity. This has occurred because the primary 
methods of increasing prestige, typically by increasing average entrance exam scores like the 
SAT or ACT, are known to reduce diversity (Hurtado 1992; Bowen and Bok 1998). Ranking 
organizations, such as US News & World Report enforce these methods by relying on selectivity 
measures (standardized test scores, acceptance rate, etc) to rank the “academic quality” (proxy 
for prestige), of universities and specific programs within universities2, (Toma 2008; Millem 
2003; Meredith 2004; Astin and Henson 1977). 
Astin (1985 and 2012) and Hurtado (1992) argue that universities are too focused on 
prestige as a direct byproduct of the hierarchal structure of higher education, and the specific 
methods universities must use to increasing their prestige, via university rankings, are 
detrimental to the goal of increasing diversity. A university’s position in the hierarchy is 
determined by its prestige, which is supposed to be indicative of the quality of educational 
                                                 
1 Particularly racial diversity of student bodies.  
2 A majority of all other ranking organizations use the same methods of ranking university 
prestige, including Forbes, Princeton Review, and Newsweek. 
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training provided by the university (Astin 1985; 2012). However, the rankings systems used to 
measure excellence utilize problematic criteria to determine rankings, so that rankings end up 
being a measure of a university’s resources and characteristics of students before they arrive at 
the university instead of an actual measure of the educational training the university provides its 
students (Astin 1985; 2012). Despite this flaw, high rankings are important to universities, since 
prestige draws competitive, high scoring, upper-class students and prestigious faculty3, large 
donations, and grants (Toma 2008; Milem 2003). Although racial diversity in student bodies has 
been shown to provide many benefits to universities’ actual academic training and quality (Gurin 
1999; Alger 1998), diversity does not generally bring in money or other types of resources that 
are valued in ranking evaluations. For that reason, while universities may value and aim to 
increase diversity, they generally do not pursue diversity as intensely as increased ranking and 
are willing to engage in practices that increase ranking but are known to be detrimental for 
increasing diversity (Bowen and Bok 1998; Hurtado 1992; Milem 2003; Haycock et al 2010). 
Using original data from independent surveys administered to select university 
administrators and administrative (demographic) data from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System, IPEDS, this study explores the specific pressures placed on universities 
in a national consortium of public liberal arts colleges (COPLAC) to increase their rankings and 
increase diversity, the source of those pressures, how those universities have responded to those 
pressures over time, and how well these universities are doing in achieving these goals.  
COPLAC has a stated mission of providing high quality and selective liberal arts 
education to populations who previously have not had widespread access to selective and 
                                                 
3 Both of which bring in monetary resources to universities 
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prestigious private liberal arts colleges, which epitomizes the struggle between increasing 
diversity (as well as access) and increasing prestige and rankings via selectivity. However, 
despite the focus on diversity in the consortium, most COPLAC universities currently have low 
levels of racial diversity, similar to many other selective universities that do not share similar 
goals regarding access and diversity. This tension between the access mission and prestige makes 
COPLAC universities excellent cases for exploring university responses to the pressures to 
prioritize increasing rankings, prestige, and selectivity over increasing diversity. 
1.1 Why Diversity Matters 
Research shows the most selective and prestigious U.S. universities have historically 
been and remain majority White with relatively low numbers of racial minorities (Ashkenas, 
Park, and Pearce 2017). This trend means racial minorities are less likely to be accepted to and 
graduate from prestigious and selective universities, placing them at a disadvantage in the labor 
market which greatly values degrees from selective and prestigious universities (Brittain and 
Bloom 2010; Carnevale and Rose 2003; Karen 2002; Schiffin 2015). While affirmative action 
policies were successful in increasing minority enrollments at prestigious and selective 
universities, particularly at public flagship universities, several court cases and political pressure 
has led to a decrease in the use of such policies and dampened the upward trajectory of racial 
minority enrollments (Hurtado 1992; Milem 2003; Niu and Tienda 2012; Long 2004). In some 
places, such as Texas, across the board acceptance programs for students in the top ten percent of 
high school graduating classes have rebounded the minority enrollment rates, but not to the same 
level as under more open and widespread affirmative action policies (Ashkenas et al 2017, Niu 
and Tienda 2012; Long 2004). 
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This lack of diversity is problematic for universities. Research shows a significant 
increase in learning outcomes for all groups when classrooms are racially and economically 
diverse (Alger 1998; Gurin 1999). Students greatly benefit from being able to exchange ideas 
and experiences with other students from different backgrounds, because diverse classrooms 
push students to be critical of their social and ideological position by exposing them to an array 
of ideas and experiences often different or contradictory to their own (Alger 1998; Gurin 1999; 
AAU 1997 and 2015). Furthermore, when universities infuse diversity and multiculturalism 
directly into the curriculum, students are more likely to gain critical thinking skills (MacPhee, 
Krueter, and Fritz 1994). This increase in critical thinking skills is valued in the labor market and 
benefits society by creating well-rounded citizens (Schneider 2009; Conference Board 2006; 
Hart Research for AACU 2013 and 2015).  
Racially diverse classrooms also provide all racial groups with the opportunity to find 
commonalities across racial lines, which helps students gain more complex and accepting 
attitudes towards other racial groups, which is both valuable and necessary in our increasingly 
diverse society (Alger 1998; Gurin 1999). Students who socialize with students of different 
races, engage in regular discussion of social, political, and racial issues, and participate in 
courses or workshops on race or ethnicity show more dedication to promoting racial 
understanding than those who do not engage with diverse people or issues of race and racism 
(Milem 1994). While the mere presence of minorities alone is not enough to ensure these 
positive learning and social outcomes (this requires active engagement in classrooms and campus 
activities, as well as multicultural curriculum) (Milem, Chang, and Antonio 2005), surely the 
presence of diverse bodies and minds in classrooms and on campus is a prerequisite for such 
diverse interactions, engagements, and exchanges (Gurin 1999; Change 1996 and 1997). The 
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perpetuation of racially and economically homogenous classrooms prevents this exchange of 
cultures and ideas which dampens the potential learning outcomes of all the students.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The United States higher education system is highly stratified in terms of prestige, and 
the amount of prestige a university possesses is used as an indicator of the academic quality of 
the university (Astin 1985; 2012). Although prestige is not necessarily a true measure of a 
university’s academic quality, it is certainly treated as so in the higher education system. 
University ranking and reputation are generally just reflections of the university’s selectivity, 
determined by average SAT scores of incoming freshmen and acceptance rate, and a university’s 
resources, which is measured in terms of endowments and quality of faculty (whether faculty 
were trained at prestigious universities and their research productivity (Astin 2012). Of these 
criteria, average SAT scores of entering freshman class is a major benchmark used in 
determining a university’s ranking by U.S. News and World Report and other ranking entities 
(Toma 2008; Milem 2003; Meredith 2004; Astin and Henson 1977). This pushes universities to 
create more policies that increase the selectivity of the school, which often comes at the cost of 
admitting racial minority students who have similar grades but, on average, lower average SAT 
scores than White applicants (Bowen and Bok 1998; Rothstein 2004).  
University ranking is meant to be a signifier of the academic quality of a university, but 
the measure of university ranking is heavily based on SAT scores which measure characteristics 
of students before they come to the university. This does little to nothing to showcase the quality 
of academic training or experiences provided by the university itself (Astin 1985) but is instead a 
simple reflection of the fact that upper-class students with high test scores desire to attend the 
institution because they perceive the university to have a high academic quality (Collins 1979). 
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This practice is problematic for diversity because students from upper-middle class backgrounds 
tend to score higher on standardized tests, regardless of ability, due to cultural biases in the tests 
with which favor more affluent students (Freedle 2003; Bowen and Bok 1998; Crouse and 
Trusheim 1988; Zwick 2004; Hurtado 1992). This link between student background and 
standardized test performance is so strong that, on average, every $10,000 increase in yearly 
family income is associated with a 10 to 15-point increase in math and verbal SAT scores 
(College Board 2015 and 2010).  
The common defense for the continued use of SAT scores despite these biases is that 
SAT scores are a standardized measure of applicants’ ability to succeed in college courses 
(Bowen and Bok 1998; Zwick 2004; Kobrin and Michel 2006), but a wide body of research on 
the effectiveness of standardized test scores, particularly the SAT, as predictors of college 
performance and success show that standardized tests are very poor measures of student ability 
and college performance (Bowen and Bok 1998; Zwick and Sklar 2005; Rothstein 2004; Niu and 
Tienda 2012). In fact, SAT scores are only somewhat reliable in predicting first-year grade point 
average, but fail to predict college GPA beyond that and fail to predict college retention or 
graduation altogether (Niu and Tienda 2012; Zwick 2004; Bowen and Bok 1998; Willingham, 
Lewis, Morgan, and Ramist 1990).  
Despite these issues with the SAT, the average SAT score of a university’s incoming 
freshman class is still a major factor in the evaluation of the university’s ranking for the year 
from organizations such as US News & World Report. Given the ability of rankings to draw 
upper-class students, faculty, and staff (and their money, which colleges desperately need as 
operating costs skyrocket and public funding continues to decrease), colleges are compelled to 
use any criteria set by the rankings organizations (Meredith 2004; Heller and Rogers 2006; 
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Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). Furthermore, select few universities possess high levels of 
prestige, and upper-class families tend to favor those universities. These preferences engender a 
cyclical system in which high-scoring, upper-class students select highly ranked universities for 
their prestige, and highly ranked universities select high-scoring, upper-class students to preserve 
their prestige (Rivera 2015; Collins 1979; Lifschitz, Saunders, and Stevens 2014; Milem 2003; 
Hurtado 1992). These high-scoring, upper-class students are most often White, and, although 
there are many qualified racial minority applicants, they tend to have lower test scores. 
Prestigious universities often do not accept these lower scoring racial minority applicants due to 
their desire to preserve their prestige and rank4. 
Universities with low or moderate levels of prestige often employ the practices of high 
prestige universities in order to increase their own rankings (Berdahl 1985). Both Riesman 
(1956) and Astin (1985) have described this phenomenon. Riesman (1956) described higher 
education as a snakelike entity with the most prestigious universities serving as the head of the 
snake. These top universities serve as the standard by which selective but not reputationally 
prestigious middle range universities5 aim to achieve by incorporating the practices and policies 
of the top universities. Similarly, the lower ranked universities make up the snake’s tail, and they 
are attempting to look more like the selective middle range universities. Through this process, 
the body of the snake begins to look more like the head of the snake, and the tail begins to look 
like the body, which leads to less distinctiveness in institutional forms and practices as 
                                                 
4 Applicants with lower test scores lower the university’s average entering test scores, which is a 
major factor in establishing rankings 
5 selective but not the most prestigious 
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universities become trapped in a cycle of mimicry to achieve upward mobility in the hierarchy 
(Riesman 1956).  
Astin (1985) expands upon this model and articulates the specific methods universities 
use to mimic higher ranked universities. Astin argues that universities move up the hierarchy and 
mimic more prestigious universities by maximizing the resources by which position in the 
hierarchy is determined. In Astin’s model, the subsequent struggle to move up the hierarchy by 
competing for the same resources, such as high scoring students, highly productive and 
prestigiously trained faculty, and increasing endowments, leads to institutional conformity and 
the homogeneity that Riesman describes (Astin 1985; Riesman 1956).  
2.1 Neoinstitutional Theory Applied to the Prestige/Diversity Tension 
Neoinstitutional theory provides the best framework for understanding how and why 
universities are becoming homogeneous. Neoinstitutionalism builds upon a multidisciplinary 
body of literature aimed at explaining organizations’ creation, growth, development, and change. 
Neoinstitutional theory argues that institutional change is constant and a necessary step in every 
organizations’ development and longevity (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Furthermore, these 
changes tend to be in ways that lead institutions to become more like other institutions in their 
fields in terms of goals and practices through the process of isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue this “standardization” is common and, most 
often, the natural result of the diffusion of successful models from “dominant professional elites” 
and this “diffusion” is a response to environmental pressures. The process of standardization 
moves organizations towards the practices of standard-bearers in the field, which Brint and 
Karabel argue emerge because “organizational fields [are] arenas of power relations with some 
actors –generally those possessing superior material and /or symbolic resources – occupying 
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more advantaged positions than others’’ (1991: 355). Universities that want to occupy a more 
advantaged position in the field than they currently do will look to the models of universities that 
have already succeeded in reaching those positions as guides for achieving similar success. 
 Per neoinstitutional theory, various environmental pressures and institutional events 
catalyze changes towards homogeneity. Demographic changes, addition or increase in power of 
competitors in a given field, and major historical events are prevalent pressures. However, the 
main stimulants for isomorphism in the higher education field are the conflict between current 
status and aspirational status in the field, competition among institutions for resources and 
prestige, and the desire for higher academic reputation (Brint and Karabel 1991; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991).  
There are three specific ways in which institutions become isomorphic: through coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) state that while these three types of pressures are unique and have separate causes 
and outcomes, they often work in conjunction with one another, meaning there is usually more 
than one of the following types of pressures present in any institutional setting. 
Coercive pressures occur when a legitimate authority mandates certain actions and 
behaviors from all institutions within the power of its authority (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) give many examples of coercive isomorphism, including 
manufacturers adopting new pollution control technology to conform to environmental 
regulations, organizations hiring affirmative action officers to proactively counter discrimination 
suits, and nonprofits hiring accountants to comply with federal tax laws. In higher education, 
these pressures can come from the federal government through financial aid policies, the 
governing body of the state higher education system through budget allocations, and commercial 
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rankings organizations which set criteria by which rankings are determined (Hackett 1990; 
Haycock et al 2010).  
The governing bodies of state systems of higher education are often the greatest source of 
coercive pressures on universities in intended and unintended ways. The intended coercive 
pressures are generally in the form of policies regulating certain behaviors and practices on 
campuses, such as smoking and carrying firearms on campus, as well as more comprehensive 
policies about yearly enrollment growth, retention, and graduation rates (Hurtado 2003; 
Levinson 1989; Scott 1995). Institutions in the system respond to the pressures of the state 
governing body because these bodies regulate the distribution of state funding to institutions in 
the system, and compliance with the policies and desires of the governing board generally leads 
to better funding and greater access to state resources for these institutions (Astin 1985).  
Additionally, these governing bodies aim to allocate state resources, generally funding, to 
institutions in the system in a way that minimizes redundancy and maximize productivity and 
efficiency throughout the system (Hines 1988; Berdahl 1985; Birnbaum 1983; Mangeiri and 
Arnn 1986). For instance, the governing body may prevent a university from starting a medical 
program due to the presence of such a program at another university in close proximity, or it may 
require a university to start a physics program due to the lack of such a program in the local 
region. In this sense, it would seem that state governing boards actually prevent universities from 
becoming homogeneous. However, the restriction of certain programs and practices is not 
enough to increase diverse institutional forms and practices or prevent homogenization 
(Birnbaum 1983; Astin 1985). Despite the intentions of the state governing body, the governing 
body actually ends up promoting homogeneity by providing the most resources to the top tier 
universities in the state, based on variety of programs offered and levels of degrees granted, and 
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the least funding to the bottom tier institutions, which tend of have fewer programs and grant 
only associates or some bachelor’s degrees. This practice incentivizes all universities in the 
hierarchy to model themselves on institutions in the tier above them to procure more state 
funding, fitting with Reisman’s (1958) and Astin’s (1985) description of the higher education 
hierarchy. This is the unintended coercive pressure presented by state governing boards on 
institutions. 
Mimetic pressures occur when institutions face uncertainty, particularly in relation to 
increasing legitimacy and prestige (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). As a result of this uncertainty, 
institutions mimic the organizational model of other institutions they view as more prestigious 
and legitimate. For example, in the late 1800’s Japan observed and emulated western courts, 
navies, education systems, and financial systems as the model for its new modern Japan 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
Higher education is a field where the quality of the product produced, i.e. quality of 
educational training and learning outcomes, is complex and difficult to measure in a single 
straightforward way. This complexity causes uncertainty in determining which practices actually 
lead to the best educational outcomes, leading universities to mimic the practices of other 
institutions in the field which are considered prestigious and legitimate (Brewer, Gates, and 
Goldman 2002). In the place of a true measurement system for academic quality6, a system of 
ranking based on perceptions of quality arises based on characteristics of students entering the 
university (although this does nothing to measure what quality or skills that are added by the 
                                                 
6 such a system would account for the value added aspect of education, i.e. how much have 
students learned, what have students achieved, and what skills have students gained while 
enrolled at the university 
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university itself and whether students stay and finish) (Bowen and Bok 1998; Brewer et al 2002; 
Eckel 2008). In the absence of accurate measures of academic quality, universities that already 
have prestige, generally Ivy League universities, national universities that have long been 
favored by upper-class families, and state flagship universities are assumed to have the best 
practices, highest academic quality, and produce the strongest educational outcomes (Brewer et 
al 2002; Karabel 2005; Stevens 2007). As a result, the general institutional form, policies, and 
practices of those universities become the standard, and any university that seeks to increase its 
position in the hierarchy will incorporate those policies and practices in their institutional forms 
(Brewer et al 2002).   
In other words, lower ranked universities will mimic the policies and practices of more 
prestigious universities because they believe those universities have better academic outcomes 
and doing so will allow them to move up the hierarchy (Dey, Milem, and Berger 1997; Jencks 
and Riesman 1968). In order to increase ranking, prestige, and legitimacy, institutions follow the 
recruitment and acceptance practices of the top tier school, such as maximizing acceptance of 
students with the highest SAT score, recruiting at predominantly White upper-middle class high 
schools, obtaining and creating more campus resources aimed at interests of upper and upper 
middle class White students, such as newer and larger fitness centers, instead of those that are 
proven to draw racial minorities such as Black, Hispanic, and multicultural Greek letter 
organizations and need-based financial aid, scholarships, and grants (Scott and Meyer 1994; 
Brewer et al 2002). These problematic practices are harmful to increasing diversity, but are 
successful at increasing rankings.  
Lifschit, Saunders, and Stevens (2014) work on “status leakage” between academic 
prestige and prestige in college sports conference membership provides further evidence that 
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mimicking more prestigious universities provides positive rankings outcomes for universities, 
and that rankings often measure perceptions over actual academic characteristics of universities. 
The authors discovered a reciprocal relationship between academic reputation and athletic 
conference membership.  Specifically, they found that the reputation of a college sports team is 
influenced by the academic reputation of the university, impacting which conference a university 
is likely to join, and, vice versa, membership in a prestigious sports conference influences the 
perceived academic reputation of a university (Lifschit et al 2014). The most academically 
prestigious universities often are in the most prestigious sports conferences. Less academically 
prestigious universities must mimic the academic programs, practices, and policies of prestigious 
universities in order to make themselves eligible for entry into prestigious conferences. 
Furthermore, if a university is accepted into a prestigious sports conference, their academic 
reputation also increases independent of any actual changes in the university, implying that 
membership in the prestigious sports conference creates the perception of academic quality 
which is then measured in rankings as actual academic quality.  
Normative pressures occur when people within different institutions in a field share 
similar educational training and professional networks (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Due to 
socialization during their educational training and current professional network associations, 
university staff tend to share common values and beliefs about their shared field, individual 
institutions, and what constitutes legitimate policies and practices for addressing problems faced 
by institutions in their field, including the problem of increasing university ranking and diversity 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In other words, admissions professionals at a university in 
California will share core values and beliefs as well as training with admissions professionals at 
a university in Maine. These shared beliefs and training lead to isomorphism. 
  
 
14 
In addition to serving as socialization agents, professional networks are a major source of 
normative pressures on universities due to their ability to standardize certain behaviors in the 
field. Riesman articulated in 1958 that faculty, staff, and administrators within universities were 
becoming more allied with their disciplines and individual fields instead of their local 
institutions. These professional networks and associations served as socialization agents who 
continued the socialization that began during their educational training, and allowed them to 
exchange ideas for solving issues to shared problems in the field. While this collaboration has the 
potential to lead to new and creative solutions to institutional issues, this networking also is a 
platform for certain practices and ideas to become standards in the field as they are shared from 
professional to professional while other new and creative practices may be marginalized. 
Furthermore, those seeking to be seen as legitimate practitioners in their fields will conform to 
the policies, practices, and ideas held by their educational training institutions and professional 
networks (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This does not necessarily mean that new and creative 
ideas are never introduced through these networks. On the contrary, the introduction and success 
of new ideas are quickly spread across institutions due, in large part, to these professional 
networks (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). However, the homogeneity of preferred and accepted 
educational credentials and professional network sanctioned norms hinders the potential 
introduction of policies and practices that differ significantly from the standard (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991). Since Riesman’s initial concerns in 1958, particularly in the past few decades, the 
exponential growth of professionalization in higher education has exacerbated normative 
pressures across universities.  
Neoinstitutionalism theory’s isomorphism framework applies particularly well to higher 
education institutions. All universities have unique origins and founding missions, but across 
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time, they become more like other universities in terms of university goals, standards, and 
practices (Astin 1985). For example, many universities that began as liberal arts universities have 
grown to incorporate professional programs. Additionally, Jencks and Riesman (1968) argue 
homogenization in institutional form occurs faster than differentiation. While universities are 
certainly looking for creative and new ways to meet their needs, they are also engaging in 
solutions that have been implemented at more prestigious universities who they aspire to be like, 
leading to isomorphism in the system as a whole. Scott and Meyer (1994) found universities 
benefit from this conformity in terms of attracting high scoring students and resources. However, 
conformity to this single model has done nothing to increase racial diversity, which is 
desperately needed at so many prestigious and middle range universities (Hackett 1990; Scott 
and Meyer 1994; Eckel 2008). 
2.2 COPLAC 
This study examines the presence, types, sources, and outcomes of isomorphic pressures 
on middle tier universities and their consequences on racial diversity. For this study, the 
universities in the Council of Public Liberal Arts Colleges, COPLAC, are a perfect sample of 
middle tier universities, as all the universities in COPLAC are classified as selective or highly 
selective by US News & World Report, and have diversity and access in their mission and vision 
statements or strategic plans, in addition to the focus on access in the COPLAC mission.  
While liberal arts training is ubiquitous in the U.S., the vast majority of liberal arts 
universities are private. Moreover, most private universities, regardless of training type, tend to 
be majority White, expensive, and often have legacy policies that aid White, upper class, 
children of alumni in the admissions process over all other applicants (Carnevale and Rose 
2003). COPLAC institutions, on the other hand, are dedicated to merging the high ideals of a 
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liberal arts education with the benefits of a public university, such as affordability, access to 
public and government funded scholarships, geographical proximity, and a focus on diversity 
(Urgo 2014; Spellman 2010). These characteristics have been central to COPLAC since 1987, 
when David Brown, the University of North Carolina Asheville’s Chancellor, and Robert Scott, 
the Ramapo College of New Jersey’s president, began their search to identify public universities 
that were providing high-quality liberal arts educations that could compete with the elite, private 
liberal arts colleges at the same costs as public universities with public standards of access 
(Schuman 2014; Maxeiner 1997).  
 In 1987, Brown, Scott, and the UNC Asheville Institutional Research Department 
conducted a nationwide search to identify standalone7 liberal arts focused universities classified 
at least as “competitive” in Barron’s Guide that had average entering SAT and ACT scores 
above the national average, the highest average entering SAT and ACT scores in the state among 
non-flagship state schools, with less than 5,000 undergraduate students and less than 500 
graduate students (Maxeiner 1997). Their search identified a small set of universities that were 
doing exceptionally good work, but were not receiving enough support from state legislators or 
the general population (Schuman 2014; Maxeiner 1997). Universities that met most of the 
criteria were invited to meet at UNC Asheville in 1988 to discuss the possible creation of a new 
sector in higher education: public liberal arts (Schuman 2014; Maxeiner 1997).  
Universities that attended the first meeting found common ground in their dedication to 
providing liberal arts education to public populations, and this shared purpose drove this small 
group for the following years as they began organizing and pushing for national recognition 
                                                 
7 not a college within a larger university or a branch campus 
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(Maxeiner 1997). With the help of a public relations agency, the group pushed a distinctive 
public liberal arts identity and began to receive recognition in higher education circles (Maxeiner 
1997). In 1993, Edward Fiske included an introductory section to public liberal arts colleges in 
his College Guide, the Association of American Colleges & Universities published a major 
article by Robert Scott on public liberal arts colleges, and in 1995, the US News & World Report 
published a feature article on public liberal arts colleges (Maxeiner 1997; Schuman 2014). By 
1992, the basic structure, membership criteria, and mission were solidified, and formally 
announced in Washington D.C. in 1993 (Schuman 2014; Maxeiner 1997). In January of 1994, 
Robert Black, then COPLAC chair, announced the official founding of the consortium at the 
annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges & Universities (Maxeiner 1997). 
Their work during this period granted the consortium a small degree of celebrity, and 
they began using the tagline of “small public ivy’s.” This slogan created some contention in the 
consortium, because some members felt the “public ivy” image was not accurate and created the 
perception of elitism, while others felt the group should embrace the slogan, which projected an 
image of high academic quality (Schuman 2014). This contention over the tagline was a 
byproduct of a larger issue within the consortium over who they aimed to serve (Schuman 2014). 
While all the universities in the consortium were selective, some members believed COPLAC 
universities should admit students who were competitive with those admitted to top national 
liberal arts college and research universities while others believed a more modest level of 
selectivity would suffice, allowing COPLAC to better serve the public (Schuman 2014). At the 
core of this debate over selectivity in admissions was a question of whether COPLAC would 
pursue the prestige, traditions, and practices of the private liberal arts colleges and public 
flagship universities or focus on their own brand of public liberal arts education for smart but 
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underserved students (Maxeiner 1997). Eventually, the consortium decided that while selectivity 
would be an important characteristic of their universities, they would not be pursuing Ivy League 
levels of selectivity (Schuman 2014).  
However, the contention between increasing prestige and maintaining access remains a 
major issue within the consortium and is imbedded in the mission of COPLAC which states: “the 
Council of Public Liberal Arts Colleges advances the aims of its member institutions and drives 
awareness of the value of high-quality, public liberal arts education in a student-centered, 
residential environment” (COPLAC Strategic Plan 2008). COPLAC defines high quality as 
“offering the best possible education…comparable to the curriculum and approaches of the long-
established, private liberal arts institutions,” and public as “committed to making liberal arts 
education available to all, including students who might not otherwise have access to this type of 
higher education.” Although the goal of high-quality, rigor, and selectivity does not have to 
conflict with the goal of access and opportunity, the low rates of minority enrollments at 
COPLAC universities means the “public” goal of providing liberal arts education to those who, 
historically, have not has access to prestigious private liberal arts education is not being 
achieved.  
3 METHODS 
This study is based on the premise that membership in COPLAC allows non-flagship 
universities to differentiate themselves from other middle range universities and become 
competitive with the top tier universities. The idea that differentiation allows universities to 
increase their prestige and ranking is supported by Lifschit, Saunders, and Stevens (2014) work 
where universities use sports teams and membership in prestigious sports conferences to 
differentiate themselves from other universities and mimic more prestigious universities to 
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increases their rankings and prestige. Differentiation from same status peers facilitates 
isomorphism with higher ranked universities and their policies, practices, and institutional forms. 
The COPLAC designation helps universities differentiate themselves from middle range 
universities, and it creates the potential to increase prestige, but the designation alone does not 
guarantee an increase in ranking. This study tests the hypothesis that isomorphic pressures 
compel COPLAC institutions to engage in the problematic practices to increase ranking at the 
cost of diversity (see Figure 1: Causal Model Depicting Relationship Between Isomorphism, 
Selectivity, and Diversity).  
This study aims to:  
1) determine how COPLAC universities’ and comparison universities’ racial enrollments, 
low-income enrollments, and selectivity has changed over time 
2) establish similarities and difference between COPLAC universities’ and comparison 
universities’ student racial diversities and selectivity,  
3) determine if changes in COPLAC universities’ and comparison universities’ selectivity 
have impacted their racial and low-income enrollments,  
4) determine if COPLAC universities value forms of selectivity that are known to reduce 
student racial diversity and asses if COPLAC universities are aware of isomorphic pressures on 
decisions and policies on diversity and ranking, and  
5) establish the sources and extent of influence these pressures play on COPLAC 
universities diversity and rankings decisions and policies.  
This study utilizes longitudinal administrative data from IPEDS to answer the first, 
second, and third aims, and cross-sectional original data from an independent survey 
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administered to enrollment management directors8 and admissions directors of COPLAC 
universities to answer the fourth and fifth aims.  
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 IPEDS data 
The IPEDS data provides information on how isomorphic pressures have impacted 
COPLAC universities’ diversity, via racial and low-income enrollments, and selectivity, via SAT 
scores and admissions yields, over time, using IPEDS data from the Fall 2001 to Fall 2015 
incoming freshman classes from COPLAC universities’ as well as state flagship universities. 
3.1.1.1 Data Collection  
In order to determine if COPLAC universities are enrolling underrepresented minority 
students and increasing selecting, I analyze admissions and enrollment trends using the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System9 (IPEDS). The IPEDS survey is conducted by 
the U.S. Department’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and is composed of 
annual surveys of all higher education institutions that participate in federal student financial aid 
programs. IPEDS assesses nine major topics such as enrollment, the demographic characteristics 
of enrolled students, student costs and financial aid, facilities, and types of degrees offered 
(IPEDS 2013). Data is reported at the institutional level. A major benefit of using IPEDS data is 
the level of stringency and accountability that exists with using data from a large-scale 
                                                 
8 I previously considered using provosts, but decided against using that population because 
provosts are highly transient and less likely to be familiar with the university history in relation 
to COPLAC. Furthermore, they are less involved with the processes and pressures associated 
with enrolling students than enrollment management directors, who are very closely aligned with 
this area and generally less transient. 
9 See Appendix A: Original IPED Variables for full variable information 
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government agency. All institutions receiving federal student financial aid are required to submit 
administrative data to all nine IPEDS surveys or risk losing their financial aid programs, 
resulting in a nearly non-existent nonresponse rate. IPEDS data is publically available for 
download from the NCES Data Center website. 
3.1.1.2 Dependent Variables 
The primary outcome of interest is racial and economic diversity. In order to measure 
racial diversity, I use variables from the Fall Enrollment IPEDS survey that measure the 
percentage of students in the incoming freshman class (first-time, full-time freshmen) that are 
White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Underrepresented Minorities (which I define as Black, 
Hispanic, and Other Underrepresented Minorities10). The racial enrollment data are reported as 
total number of students in each category that are enrolled. I converted these variables from total 
enrollment numbers to percentages by dividing each racial category variable by the variable that 
measure the total number of first time, full time students enrolled at each university. I use the 
percentage of the incoming freshman class that received federal grant aid, primarily Pell grants 
and other need-based grants, from the Student Financial Aid and Net Price IPEDS survey as a 
measure of economic diversity. 
3.1.1.3 Independent Variables 
Selectivity. The primary predictor of interest in this study is selectivity11. I operationalize 
selectivity using two commonly used measures: the percentage of first-time, degree seeking 
                                                 
10 The Other Underrepresented minority group includes Native Americans, two or more races, 
and unknown races. 
11 Selectivity variables are also dependent variables in the effect of time analyses and effect of 
institutional form analyses 
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students in the freshman class who scored at the 75th percentile of verbal and math sections of the 
SAT/ACT as well as each institutions’ annual acceptance rate, operationalized as the percentage 
of applicants who were accepted into the incoming freshman class.12 
COPLAC and State Flagship universities. In addition to determining the overall 
trajectory of COPLAC universities’ selectivity, racial enrollment, and economic diversity and the 
effect of selectivity on the racial and economic diversity of COPLAC institutions, I compare the 
trajectories and effects of COPLAC universities to state flagship universities13. State flagship 
universities are generally regionally prestigious, moderately expensive, offer moderate financial 
aid, and have low minority enrollments. State flagship universities are geographically proximate 
to COPLAC universities, the primary competitors for high achieving in-state students, and the 
standard to which COPLAC universities are pushed via coercive pressures (particularly 
governing bodies of state higher education systems). The comparison between COPLAC 
universities and state flagship universities tests whether COPLAC universities are becoming 
isomorphic to state flagship universities in terms of selectivity and diversity, and which aspects 
of the COPLAC mission (prestige or access) COPLAC universities are achieving.  
The universities designated as COPLAC in this sample were pulled based on the 
membership list available on the COPLAC website (COPLAC 2017). This list also included the 
states in which each COPLAC university was located. This information was used to determine 
                                                 
12 IPEDS includes a measure of the percent of applicants who were granted admissions 
into the university in the Admissions and Test Score version of the survey. However, this 
variable is only available from 2006 to 2015. I created an admissions yield variable for 2001 to 
2005 by dividing the variable that measures the number of applicants accepted into the university 
by the variable that measures the total number of applicants.  
13 I previously intended to compare COPLAC universities to their public and private aspirational 
peers as well. However, I was not able to create these comparison groups due to an inability to 
collect data on what universities COPLAC universities consider peer. 
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which flagship universities to include in the sample. Using a recent study from The New York 
Times on racial enrollments of major US universities (Ashkenas et al 2017), I created a list of 
state flagship universities in states with COPLAC universities. This yielded an n of 55, with 28 
COPLAC universities and 27 flagship universities. Most states had one COPLAC university, but 
one state (Virginia) had two COPLAC universities, resulting in only one corresponding flagship 
university between those two COPLAC universities.  
I created a dichotomous variable, flagship, where COPLAC universities are the reference 
category, to designate universities as COPLAC universities or state flagship universities in order 
to estimate the effect of institutional form. 
3.1.1.4 Control Variables 
In addition to the main selectivity variables, I include additional variables in the analyses 
which can also affect the racial and economic diversity of incoming students. The variables 
account for the costs associated with applying to and attending the universities in the sample. I 
use the application fee variable from the Student Charges IPEDS survey to measure the cost of 
applying to each university. This is a ratio variable, measured in dollars, with a potential 
minimum value of $0 and no set maximum value. I use the published in-state tuition and fees 
variables from the Student Charges IPEDS survey to measure the cost of attendance (not 
including other academic costs, such as books, or living expenses such as rent, food costs, and 
utilities). This is a ratio variable, and has the same potential minimum and maximum dollar 
values as the application fee variable14.  
                                                 
14 I originally included a control variable for degree of urbanization, which I later dropped due to 
the need to be parsimonious with a small n and lack of significance. 
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3.1.2 Independent Survey data 
In addition to the IPEDS data, I also collected data from COPLAC admissions officials 
using a web-based survey. The survey consists of four questions on general issues regarding 
university context and background, as well as the source and impact of isomorphic pressures 
(See Appendix C: Survey Instrument). In the survey, participants are asked to select the 
importance of applicants’ SAT scores in their university’s admissions decision from a Likert 
scale ranging from “extremely important” to “Not at all important15.” This question establishes if 
COPLAC universities engage in practices known to reduce diversity. Participants are also asked 
if any external organization, including the governing board of state system of higher education, 
COPLAC, and ranking agencies, place pressure on or demand the university increase student 
racial diversity or ranking16. Respondents select “yes” or “no” for this question. This information 
establishes whether common sources of coercive isomorphic pressures are openly exerting 
pressures on COPLAC universities and if COPLAC universities are aware of external 
organizations’ desires for COPLAC universities to exhibit certain behaviors. The survey also 
includes two questions in which respondents are asked to identify sources that influence their 
university’s decisions and policies about student racial diversity and rankings. A number of 
sources consistent with neoinstitutional theory (state, peer networks, or competitors) are 
presented and participants must report if and the extent to which each source impacts the 
university’s policies and decisions about diversity and rankings. The first part of each question 
requires respondents to select “yes” or “no” for each source. Respondents can then indicate the 
                                                 
15 For ease of comparison, the two highest categories were collapsed and the two lowest 
categories were collapsed to mirror the categories for extent of impact questions. 
16 Although this is one question, it contains two separate sections in which the question is asked 
once for student racial diversity and once for rankings.  
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extent to which that source impacts university policies and practices. The level of impact options 
are “barely impacts,” “somewhat impacts,” and “greatly impacts.” The sources are: aspirational 
peer universities, the state system of higher education’s governing body, COPLAC, universities 
at which employees have previously been employed, employees’ professional organizations and 
networks, and employees’ educational training. Aspirational peers are sources of mimetic 
isomorphic pressures, the state system of higher education’s governing body and COPLAC are 
sources of coercive isomorphic pressures, and universities where employees were previously 
employed, employee’s professional organization, and employees’ educational training are 
sources of normative isomorphic pressures. 
3.1.2.1 Survey Data Collection and Sample 
The original, cross-sectional data was collected via a Qualtrics survey. I contacted the 
enrollment management director and admissions director at all 28 COPLAC universities in the 
United States17 via telephone and email. I sent an introductory email to explain the purpose of 
my study, and elicit participation. Each introductory email included a unique URL survey link 
for each individual in the sample. Each participant’s link was valid for 30 days from the time 
they begin the survey. If the participant has not completed the survey within 30 days, the survey 
closed, at which time responses were stored, and unanswered questions were classified as 
missing data.  
I sent follow-up emails after 30 days, 45 days, and 60 days to each individual in the sample 
                                                 
17 I am excluding the one Canadian COPLAC university, which leaves 28 members institutions 
and a n of 56 when accounting for two respondents (one admission director and one enrollment 
management director) from each institution. However, the university is the unit of analysis so the 
true n=28, and most respondents were the only respondant from their university. 
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who had not completed the survey. Additionally, I called every person in the sample three times, 
between emails, to elicit participation. During the second round of phone calls several 
individuals in the sample stated they wanted to participate but the length of the survey was time 
prohibitive. This explanation correlated with a pattern of participants opening the survey, 
completed between 1-3 questions and not finishing the survey. In order to fix this issue, I 
reduced the length of the survey from the original 28 questions to four main, multipart close 
ended questions (See Appendix D for original survey instrument). This drastically increased the 
survey response rate.  
Twenty-three respondents opened the original survey, but only twelve completed it. In 
comparison, fourteen people opened the revised survey and all fourteen participants who viewed 
it completed the survey. 
Twenty-six out 5518 COPLAC administrators completed the survey. Eleven respondents 
were admissions directors and 15 were enrollment management vice presidents. Respondents 
were from 20 different COPLAC universities out of 28 universities in the consortium. 
3.2 Analysis 
3.2.1 IPEDS Data Analyses 
I use two sample t-tests to determine if the selectivity, costs, and enrollments of COPLAC 
universities and state flagship universities are significantly different in 2015 in comparison to 
2001. Two sample t-tests are suited to this analysis for their ability to compare means between 
two groups for significant differences. This analysis will determine how COPLAC universities 
and state flagship universities, as distinct groups, have changed from 2001 to 2015. The two-
                                                 
18 One Enrollment Management Vice President position was vacant 
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sample t-test test within-group (COPLAC universities in 2001 compared to COPLAC 
universities in 2015 or state flagship universities in 2001 compared to state flagship universities 
in 2015) differences. While these tests can establish simple changes (or lack of change) within 
the same institutional type, they cannot compare COPLAC universities to state flagship 
universities over multiple time points. Random effects Generalized Least Squares regressions 
(xtreg in STATA) were used to test for between-group differences over time, because this 
analysis can account for longitudinal data19. This analysis establishes if the trajectory of 
COPLAC universities and state flagship universities on each variable is similar or significantly 
different20. 
I also use random effects GLS regressions to estimate the effect of the selectivity and cost 
variables on racial group enrollments and low-income enrollments at COPLAC universities and 
state flagship universities. These analyses included fixed effects dummy variables for states in 
which universities are located to account for state level differences and pair each COPLAC 
university to their state flagship so that the dependent variable can be estimated without 
interference from state level contexts. This analysis will provide information on the impact of 
selectivity on racial and economic diversity at COPLAC institutions over time in comparison to 
state flagship universities.  
Equation 1: Effect of Institutional Form on Enrollment, Selectivity, and Costs 
                                                 
19 observations do not have to be independent 
20 These analyses were later run as interactions between institutional form and predictor 
variables, time and predictor variables, and time and flagship and predictor variables within the 
GLS regression models estimating the effect of selectivity on racial and low-income enrollments. 
These interactions did not substantially change the effect sizes of significant variables and the 
same variables that were significant in the separated analyses were significant in the combined 
analyses with interaction terms.  
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Yst=0+ 1(flagshipt) 
Where Y is enrollment/selectivity/cost for university s in year t and flagship is a time 
invariant university characteristic that is coded for 0 for COPLAC and 1 for flagship. 
Equation 2: Effect Selectivity on Enrollment  
Yest=0+ 1(admissions yieldt) + 2(75th percentile SAT Matht) + 3(75th percentile SAT 
Readingt) + 4(application feet) + 5(yearly in-state tuition and feest) + 6(flagshipt) + (statet)+ 
Some variables contained missing data. On SAT variables, schools who reported ACT 
variables often did not report SAT variables. For these cases, I converted the ACT scores into 
SAT scores using conversions charts. This process yielded estimated scores for nearly all 
missing data. However, some data remained missing on SAT variables and other variables. In 
order to estimate the remaining missing data, I averaged the values of geographical proximate 
universities21 of the same type (COPLAC universities or state flagship universities in a single 
year for each variable. I then replaced the missing value with the average. For example, if a 
COPLAC university in Georgia was missing the application fee for 2006, I would average the 
2006 application fees of COPLAC universities in Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland and replace the Georgia COPLAC 
universities missing 2006 application fee value with the averaged value. This method combines 
the benefits of replacing missing data with group averages and hot decking. 
3.2.2 Original Survey Analyses 
I use chi-square goodness of fit tests to determine if there are significant patterns in the 
responses to each question and to determine if COPLAC universities are reporting significantly 
                                                 
21 using the five main US Census geographic regions 
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more or less influence of certain types of isomorphic pressures. The extremely small sample size 
and even smaller number of responses make these data unsuitable for higher level statistical 
testing. Chi square goodness of fit test tests for significant differences between expected and 
reported values within a single variable. This test only requires a minimum of five cases in each 
expected frequency category, which makes this test most suitable for the categorical data 
available. The findings from these chi square goodness of fit tests provide information that can 
be further tested in future studies on this population with qualitative methods.  
4 RESULTS 
Analysis of 2015 IPEDS data show dismally low rates of minority enrollment at 
COPLAC universities (IPEDS 2016) (See Figure 2). Five out of 28 COPLAC universities have 
between 21% and 30% underrepresented minority enrollment, 15 have between 11% and 20% 
underrepresented minority enrollment, and four have between 1% and 10% underrepresented 
minority enrollment. Only four COPLAC universities have between 31% and 40% 
underrepresented minority enrollments. 
Conversely,11 out of 28 COPLAC universities have between 81% and 90% White 
enrollment, 11 have between 71% and 80% White enrollment, and 6 have between 61% and 70% 
White enrollment, meaning 22 out of 28 COPLAC universities have White enrollments 
exceeding 70%. These figures show greater White enrollments than the percentage of White 
students graduating from high schools in the United States. The majority of COPLAC 
universities have higher White enrollments in 2015 than Whites’ share of the high school 
graduates in their states (See Table 3) (WICHE 2017). Only four COPLAC universities had 
White enrollments that did not exceed Whites’ share of high school graduate in their states. The 
stark differences between the racial composition of high school graduates and the racial 
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compositions of COPLAC universities means the “public” goal of providing liberal arts 
education to those who, historically, have not has access to prestigious private liberal arts 
education is not being realized. 
4.1 Aim 1: Effects of Time on COPLACs’ and State Flagships’ Selectivity, Enrollment, 
and Cost  
Table 1 shows the results of the two-sample t-tests for COPLAC universities and state 
flagship universities. In these analyses, I aimed to determine how COPLAC universities’ 
enrollment, selectivity, and cost has changed over time and how state flagship universities’ 
enrollments, selectivity, and costs have changed over time. All analyses were run separately for 
COPLAC universities and state flagships.   
Overall, COPLAC universities were very stable from 2001 to 2015.  There was no 
significant change in COPLAC universities racial enrollments during this period. Similarly, there 
was no significant change in state flagship universities’ racial enrollments during this period. 
Black and Hispanic enrollments were particularly low at both COPLAC and state flagship 
universities, ranging from the five to seven percent. Underrepresent minority enrollment was also 
very similar at COPLAC universities and state flagship universities, hovering around 25 percent. 
White enrollment was very high at both COPLAC and state flagship universities.  
These findings suggest that both COPLAC universities and state flagships had very low 
racial minority enrollment prior to 2001, because these low enrollments were stable over time. 
While this assumption could be tested by including data from prior to 2001, this study is limited 
by the data available from IPEDS. IPEDS did not collect any of the selectivity variables included 
in this study prior to 2001. 
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Additionally, there was no significant change in COPLAC universities’ selectivity from 
2001 to 2015. During this same period, however, state flagships became significantly more 
selective. State flagships decreased their admissions yield (meaning they accepted a smaller 
percentage of the total number of applicants), and increased the 75th percentile scores of the math 
and verbal portions of the SAT. The increase in selectivity at state flagships strongly aligns with 
the hypothesized relationship between state flagship universities and selectivity in the literature.  
This finding supports Haycock, Lynch, and Engle’s (2010) argument that state flagship 
universities are continuing to increase selectivity via SAT scores and at the cost of their public 
missions. According to Haycock, Lynch, and Engle (2010), the continued increase of selectivity 
at state flagship universities favors upper class applicants with higher test scores, effectively 
shutting out many qualified applicants of color. Although there is no evidence of COPLAC 
universities increasing their selectivity in these analyses, the low rate of enrollment for racial 
minorities at COPLAC universities (at very similar levels as state flagship universities) suggest 
that COPLAC universities’ racial enrollments may be becoming similar to state flagships via 
some method other than selectivity. It could also be possible that COPLAC universities 
drastically changed their selectivity to become more like state flagships prior to 2001 and are 
now in a plateau, having reached the highest level of selectivity possible for their current status 
in the higher education system. Both of these possibilities need to be tested further with other 
data sources.  
COPLAC universities and state flagships did experience some additional changes from 
2001 to 2015. During this period, both COPLAC universities and state flagship universities 
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increased their low-income enrollments, application fees, and in-state tuition and fees22. These 
findings present an interesting paradox where costs of attending COPLAC universities and state 
flagship universities have increased at the same time that the enrollments of those who would be 
least likely to afford those increases has also risen. This may be a result of the overall US 
society’s focus on higher education and the growth of low interest rate student loans instead of 
any particular intervention on the part of COPLAC universities or state flagship universities.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Aim 2: Effects of Institutional Form on COPLACs’ and State Flagships’ Selectivity, 
Enrollment, and Cost 
Table 2 presents the effects of institutional form and time on each enrollment, selectivity, 
and cost variable. These analyses determine how COPLAC universities and state flagship 
universities compare to each other on each variable over time.  
These analyses show that there is no significant difference between COPLAC universities 
and state flagship universities in Black, Hispanic, and underrepresented minority enrollment. 
This finding provides further evidence that the least represented US racial groups in higher 
education are similarly underrepresented at COPLAC universities and state flagships. Although 
this analysis cannot establish if one institutional form possessed these levels of racial enrollments 
                                                 
22 The total enrollment variable is not included in the major analyses of this study; however, it is 
interesting to note that during this period, the total first time, full time enrollment of state 
flagship universities significantly increased from an average of 3942.63 in 2001 to 4989.15 in 
2015 (p=0.01). During this same period, COPLAC did not significantly increase their first time, 
full time enrollments, although the average enrollment did increase slightly from 607.86 students 
to 726. 
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prior to the other, Ashkenas et al’s (2017) report on the racial enrollments23 of state flagships 
provides strong evidence that state flagships possessed the same racial enrollments from 1980 to 
2015, suggesting COPLAC universities have changed to become homogenous with state flagship 
universities.  
There are also some significant differences between COPLAC universities and state 
flagship universities’ racial enrollments. COPLAC universities are enrolling significantly more 
low-income students than state flagship universities. Both COPLAC universities and state 
flagship universities showed increases in low-income enrollment in the effect of time t-tests, 
suggesting that both types of universities are increasing low-income enrollment over time, but 
COPLACs are enrolling this population at a higher rate. Furthermore, state flagships have 
significantly higher application fees and in-state tuitions than COPLAC universities. Taken 
together, these findings are in line with Haycock et al’s (2010) argument that state flagships are 
increasing costs of attendance to fund projects that draw elite, high scoring applicants and then 
providing a large portion of their financial aid to those elite, upper-class students to encourage 
them to enroll at these universities. Most COPLAC universities do not have the money to 
provide this type of merit based aid, and are, generally, only able to provide financial aid to 
applicants from lower income families.  
Additionally, COPLAC universities are enrolling significantly more White students than 
state flagship universities and state flagships are enrolling significantly more Asian students. The 
effect of time t-tests established that White and Asian enrollments have not changed at 
COPLACs or state flagships from 2001 to 2015, suggesting that COPLACs have had higher 
                                                 
23 The report presents a line graph for each flagship university in the US, where each racial 
groups’ share of the freshman class is presented as a percentage 
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White enrollments than state flagships and state flagships were enrolling more Asians than 
COPLACs in 2001. Ashkenas et al (2017) once again provide evidence that at most state 
flagships (with the exception of California and New Jersey24), White and Asian enrollments have 
not changed more than a few percentage points from 1980 to 2015, suggesting COPLAC 
universities have become homogenous to state flagships.  
State flagship universities are also significantly more selective than COPLAC 
universities. The analyses show state flagships have lower admissions yield (accept fewer 
applicants) and higher math and verbal SAT scores than COPLAC universities. This finding, in 
addition to the lack of change in COPLAC selectivity over time (established in the effects of 
time t-tests), suggests that increasing selectivity may not be the mechanism by which COPLAC 
universities are becoming more like state flagships, despite evidence that COPLAC universities 
underrepresented racial minority enrollments are homogenous.  
In addition to establishing differences between COPLAC universities and state flagship 
universities, additional models with a time variable and an interaction between time and 
institutional form were also run. Table 3 shows the results of these analyses in which I aimed to 
determine if any COPLAC universities and state flagships were changing the enrollments, 
selectivity, or costs at different rates over time. Time was not significant for any enrollment or 
selectivity variable. The time variable was significant for application fee, suggesting that 
application fees significantly increased every year. The time and institutional form interaction 
was not significant for any model, suggesting that differences between state flagships and 
COPLAC universities occurred in a consistent way over time. 
                                                 
24 There was a spike in Asian enrollment and decrease in White enrollment in California and 
New Jersey starting in 1990 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3A AND 3B ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Aim 3: Impact of Selectivity on Enrollment at COPLAC universities and State 
Flagship universities 
Table 4 shows the results of analyses that estimate the effects of the selectivity variables 
and associated cost variables (with fixed effects state variables) on the racial and low-income 
enrollment variables. These analyses aim to determine the size and direction of the relationship 
between selectivity and enrollment at COPLAC and state flagship universities 
Selectivity strongly influences low-income racial enrollments. Decreases in admissions 
yield (increase in selectivity) and increases in 75th percentile score of the math portion of the 
SAT significantly decreased low-income enrollment. These findings support the relationship 
outlined in the literature between selectivity and low-income enrollment (see Haycock et al 2010, 
Carnevale and Rose 2003, and Collins 1979), where increases in selectivity result in decreases in 
low-income enrollments.  
Admissions yield also significantly predicted changes in Black, Hispanic, 
underrepresented minority, Asian, and White enrollment. Decreases in admissions yield 
(increases in selectivity) substantially decreased Hispanic and underrepresented racial minority 
enrollments and slightly decreased Black and Asian enrollments. Decreases in admissions yield 
substantially increased White enrollment. These findings also support the established 
relationship between selectivity and racial enrollments, where increases in selectivity tend to 
decrease racial minority enrollments and increase White enrollments (see Brittain and Bloom 
2010, Stevens 2007, Karen 2002, Carnevale and Rose 2003, and Bowen and Bok 1998). 
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Cost variables also significantly predicted enrollments, although these findings are 
somewhat problematic. Application fee was generally not a significant predictor of any racial or 
low-income enrollment except for White enrollment. Increases in application fees were 
associated with increases in White enrollments, which fits with previous findings on higher 
White enrollments at more expensive universities. However, this finding is somewhat reversed 
when accounting for the effect of in-state tuition and fees on enrollments. White enrollment 
somewhat decreases as in-state tuition and fees increase, while Hispanic, underrepresented racial 
minority, and low-income enrollments slightly increase as tuition and fees increase. These 
findings are inverse to the hypothesized relationship between costs and racial minority and low-
income enrollments. These findings may be the result of increased access to student loans and 
grants for racial minority and low-income students and the increasing pressures to attend college 
despite costs. Middle class White applicants who do not qualify for federal grants or who may 
have high estimated family contributions may be more sensitive to increases in tuition and fees.  
Overall, these findings suggest, regardless of institution type, selectivity tends to decrease 
racial minority and low-income enrollments and increase White enrollments.  
INSERT TABLE 4A AND 4B ABOUT HERE 
4.4 Aim 4: COPLAC Universities’ Awareness of Isomorphic Pressures 
In Table 5, I present the results of my unique data collection where I attempt to determine 
if COPLAC universities are aware of external pressures meant to elicit certain behaviors from 
their universities. COPLAC administrators were asked if any external agency or organization 
(such as COPLAC, state higher education system, or ranking agencies) placed pressures on their 
universities to increase student racial diversity or rankings.  A majority of respondents reported 
that no external agency placed pressures on their universities to increase either student racial 
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diversity or rankings. Chi Square Goodness of Fit tests confirmed that significantly more 
respondents reported a lack of such pressures rather than their presence.  
A wide body of literature on higher education, diversity, and rankings suggest this is not 
the case, and most universities are under pressure from a variety of sources to increase their 
rankings and student racial diversity (see Toma 2008, Steven 2007, Meredith 2004, and Bowen 
and Bok 1998). These findings suggest that COPLAC administrators either are not aware of such 
pressures, do not interpret external demands as “pressure,” did not wish to report these 
occurrences, or genuinely do not experience such pressures (although this is unlikely). 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
4.5 Aim 5: Sources and Impact of Isomorphic Pressures on COPLAC Universities 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the Chi Square Goodness of Fit tests where I attempt 
to determine which types of isomorphic pressures are present in COPLAC universities’ student 
racial diversity decisions and the extent of their impact on those decisions. COPLAC 
administrators were asked if the practices of aspirational peer universities (mimetic pressures), 
suggested practices from COPLAC or the state higher education system’s governing body 
(coercive pressures), practices from employees’ educational training, professional networks, or 
previous employing universities (normative pressures) influenced the COPLAC university’s 
student racial diversity or rankings decisions, and the extent to which each of those sources 
impacted those decisions (greatly, somewhat, or barely). 
Mimetic pressures appear to be a factor in COPLAC universities student racial diversity 
and rankings decisions. A majority of COPLAC administrators reported that mimetic pressures 
at least somewhat impact their student racial diversity and rankings decisions. These findings 
suggest that COPLAC universities are substantially influenced by the practices of aspirational 
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peer universities, which may explain the similarities in Black, Hispanic, and underrepresented 
minority enrollments between COPLAC universities and state flagship universities established in 
the effects of institutional form analyses.  
Normative pressures were also a factor in both student racial diversity and rankings 
decisions and practices. Respondents reported that practices COPLAC employees learned from 
their previous college or university employment somewhat to greatly influenced their 
universities student racial diversity and rankings decisions. Additionally, a significant number of 
respondents reported COPLAC employees’ educational training and professional networks 
somewhat influenced COPLAC universities rankings decisions, but the influence of these 
sources was not significant in any category (the distribution of responses was equal across 
categories).  
Although COPLAC employee’s previous employing universities are sources of 
normative pressures (as defined by neoinstitutional theory), given the relatively small size of the 
public liberal arts niche, COPLAC employees may have worked at mainstream middle range 
universities or state flagships prior to their employment at COPLACs. Furthermore, respondents 
reported that practices from COPLAC employee’s previous employers impacted COPLACs 
diversity decisions than rankings decisions. This suggest many COPLAC employees come from 
more diverse, less prestigious middle ranked universities. This provides COPLACs with 
templates for their diversity decisions but not rankings decisions. This may lead to COPLAC 
universities to utilize practices either directly from state flagship universities or other middle 
range universities that have themselves mimicked state flagship universities. This could serve to 
bolster the influence of aspirational peers on COPLAC universities’ student racial diversity and 
rankings decisions.  
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Coercive pressures are also significantly present at COPLAC universities, and tell an 
interesting story. Respondents overwhelmingly reported that COPLAC (the consortium, not 
member universities) were a significant source for their university’s student racial diversity 
decisions and practices and rankings decisions and practices. However, respondents were varied 
on the state higher education system’s governing body’s influence on universities diversity and 
rankings decisions and policies. These findings suggest that COPLAC (the consortium) is 
encouraging their member universities to increase their student racial diversity and hold true to 
their public mission while pursuing academic quality, but various state level context and a lack 
of clear direction from state higher education systems may be creating the uncertainty the 
precedes mimetic isomorphic pressures, which then push COPLAC universities further towards 
the models of state flagship universities.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this study was to determine if isomorphic pressures, pressures that drive 
universities toward homogeneity with other universities, have caused COPLAC universities to 
become more selective and less diverse. I have tested this assertion by 1) determining if 
COPLAC universities had become more selective and less diverse over time, 2) determining if 
COPLAC universities were becoming isomorphic to comparison universities, particularly state 
flagship universities, 3) determining if COPLAC universities’ selectivity was influencing their 
racial and low income enrollments, 4) determining if COPLAC universities were aware of 
isomorphic pressures from external sources, 5) and determining if COPLAC universities reported 
isomorphic pressures in the student racial diversity and rankings decisions.  
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As Astin (1985) and Riesman (1956) predicted, the middle range universities in this 
study, COPLAC universities, are becoming homogenous to universities that hold more 
prestigious positions in the higher education hierarchy. This study showcases the relationship 
between lower ranked universities’ homogenization, in terms of selectivity, and racial minority 
enrollments, which has been undertheorized and rarely tested within neoinstitutional theory. 
Furthermore, this study establishes the presence of isomorphic pressures in these university 
contexts as influencing middle range universities’ diversity decisions, which has previously been 
lacking in higher education access and diversity literature.  
Overall, it seems that COPLAC universities are becoming isomorphic and homogenous 
to state flagship universities, to an extent. Black, Hispanic, and underrepresented minority 
enrollments are similar at COPLAC universities and state flagship universities, although White 
and Asian enrollments vary. This may be the result of a ceiling effect, where COPLAC 
universities have been become homogenous enough to state flagship universities to impact 
vulnerable student populations, but do not yet possess the financial means to draw the number of 
elite, high scoring applicant necessary to become fully homogenous.  
Additionally, this study reveals competing pressures on COPLAC universities. The 
original survey data suggests that COPLAC universities experience isomorphic pressures to both 
increase student racial diversity and increase prestige. However, the enrollment data presented in 
the effects of time and effects of institutional form analyses, along with the comparison of 
COPLAC enrollments to the racial composition of high school graduates, suggests that the 
pressures to increase rankings are winning and historically underserved racial groups are losing.  
Despite the dismal Black, Hispanic, Asian, and underrepresented racial minority 
enrollments at COPLAC universities, these universities are successfully enrolling greater 
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numbers of low income students than comparison universities. This suggests that a greater 
portion of either the racial minorities or White students that are attending COPLAC universities 
are poorer than in previous years, as overall racial enrollments have not changed at COPLAC 
universities from 2001 to 2015. At least in terms of serving low-income students, COPLAC 
universities are achieving their goal of increasing access to liberal arts education.  
5.1 Limitations 
Originally, this study attempted to include several other institutional forms to serve as 
comparison models, including public and private universities that COPLAC universities 
identified as aspirational peers. These comparison groups would have been generated from data 
collected in the survey I distributed to COPLAC admissions officials. However, due to low 
response rates and a reduction in the length of the survey instrument, I was unable to collect this 
data. Without these comparison groups, COPLAC universities were only compared to state 
flagship universities, limiting the study’s ability to assess changes and patterns in COPLAC 
universities’ enrollments, selectivity, and costs against a broader set of comparison schools.  
Furthermore, while IPEDS contained data on universities’ enrollments and costs starting 
in 1988, selectivity data was only available from 2001. This study originally intended to include 
variables to account for length of membership in COPLAC to test if selectivity and enrollment 
was affected by length of membership in COPLAC. Since the IPEDS data on selectivity was not 
available prior to 2001 and COPLAC began accepting members in the early 1990’s, such an 
analysis could not be completed, further limiting the scope of this study. Furthermore, the results 
of the effects of time t-tests and effects of institutional form analyses effects of institutional form 
establish that Black, Hispanic, and underrepresented minority enrollments were already similar 
between COPLAC and state flagship universities in 2001. COPLAC universities may have 
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become homogenous before 2001, but this conclusion is only speculative since these analyses 
necessary to make a more reliable inference cannot be completed due to the lack of selectivity 
data prior to 2001.  
While the original survey data establishes the presence and extent of impact of each type 
of isomorphic pressure on COPLAC universities’ student racial diversity and rankings decisions 
and practices, they do not provide information on what those decisions and policies are and how 
they might impact student racial diversity and rankings. For example, we know that practices 
from aspiration peer universities influence student racial diversity decisions and practices at 
COPLAC but we do not know if the resulting decisions and practices increase or decrease 
student racial diversity. 
5.2 Future Directions 
This study has only begun to explore the impact of isomorphic pressures on COPLAC 
universities and their student racial and economic diversity. This study could be extended by 
including more comparison university models, such as private liberal arts universities, national 
public research universities, and private research universities. Given the continuing differences 
between COPLAC universities and state flagship universities, it could be possible that COPLAC 
universities are becoming homogenous to another institutional type, perhaps private liberal arts 
universities or some combination of institutional types.    
Building on this study, researchers might further interrogate the ways in which each type 
of isomorphic pressure enters COPLAC universities’ decision-making processes on student 
racial diversity and rankings using in-depth interviews with COPLAC university administrators. 
Researchers may also wish to investigate the presence and influence of isomorphic pressures at 
prestigious comparison universities, such as state flagship universities and private liberal arts 
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universities. Researchers could also extend beyond COPLAC universities and test for 
isomorphism among middle range universities, in general. I predict, similar to Riesman (1956), 
that isomorphic pressures are present at all types and levels of prestige, pushing all universities 
towards higher levels of prestige and greater isomorphism in the higher education system overall. 
Each of these directions would add to the limited body of knowledge that currently exists 
on the impact of isomorphic pressures on student racial diversity in higher education. 
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Figure 1: Causal Model Depicting Relationship Between Isomorphism, Selectivity, and Diversity 
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Figure 2: COPLAC Universities’ Fall 2015 Racial Enrollment  
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Table 1: Effects of Time on COPLACs’ and State Flagships’ Selectivity, Enrollment, and Cost Results 
 COPLAC Universities State Flagship Universities 
Variables 
Mean p-value Mean p-value 
2001 2015 2001 2015 
Admissions Yield (%) 
71.6786 75.75 
0.14 
71.07 59.67 
0.01** (2.8434) (2.2954) (3.2998) (3.5167) 
75th Percentile SAT Math 
576.29 578.75 
0.42 
646.85 677.78 
0.01** (8.2551) (8.308) (7.127) (10.532) 
75th Percentile SAT Verbal 
588.21 586.93 
0.47 
634.3 651.48 
0.05* (10.0151) (11.0396) (6.5097) (8.0367) 
Application Fee ($) 
$28.67  $40.61  
0.00*** 
37.41 56.81 
0.00*** (2.4608) (3.4397) (1.8941) (2.5826) 
In-State Tuition and Fees ($) 
3703.57 9275 
0.00*** 
4518.37 11426.37 
0.00*** (252.9006) (430.7473) (285.838) (535.0359) 
Black Enrollment (%) 
6.32 6.54 
0.45 
5.22 5.07 
0.43 (1.2237) (1.2382) (0.639) (0.6061) 
Hispanic Enrollment (%) 
5.96 6.43 
0.36 
6.96 7.37 
0.37 (0.8381) (0.9364) (0.8762) (0.917) 
Underrepresented Minority 
Enrollment (%) 
24.54 25.82 
0.30 
24.33 25.41 
0.28 (1.6797) (1.7654) (1.302) (1.309) 
Asian Enrollment (%) 
2.29 2.29 
0.50 
9.3 9.41 
0.48 (0.2993) (0.3037) (1.6415) (1.6245) 
White Enrollment (%) 
73.29 72 
0.31 
66.41 65.19 
0.38 (1.7472) (1.8459) (2.704) (2.6964) 
Low-Income Enrollment (%) 
29.61 35.96 
0.03* 
18.37 21.7 
0.05* (2.4739) (2.3257) (1.6349) (1.0457) 
Time is the grouping variable. 2001 COPLAC university means are compared to 2015 COPLAC university means. 
2001 State Flagship means are compared to 2015 State Flagship university means. 
***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
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Table 2A: Effect of Institutional Form on Racial and Economic Composition – Bivariate GLS Regressions Results 
 
  Dependent Variables 
  
Low-Income 
Enrollment 
Black 
Enrollment 
Hispanic 
Enrollment 
Underrepresented 
Minority 
Enrollment 
Asian 
Enrollment 
White 
Enrollment 
Independent 
Variable 
Flagship  -9.6422*** -0.4598 1.0193 0.5869 6.8385*** -7.3865* 
    (2.3302) (1.3189) (1.0106) (1.9665) (1.6758) (3.087) 
Model 
Statistics 
r2 0.1805*** 0.0022 0.0152 0.0012 0.2355*** 0.0826* 
Model Significance determined by Wald Chi Square statistic 
***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
 
Table 2B: Effect of Institutional Form on Selectivity and Costs– Bivariate GLS Regressions Results 
  Dependent Variables 
  
Admissions 
Yield 
75th 
Percentile SAT 
Math 
75th 
Percentile SAT 
Verbal 
Application 
Fee 
In-State Tuition 
and Fees 
Independent 
Variable 
Flagship  -16.0538*** 78.7335*** 45.7105*** 11.9698*** 1569.07** 
    (2.9591) (12.0079) (12.1337) (3.3282) (558.5199) 
Model 
Statistics 
r2 0.1762*** 0.4135*** 0.1862*** 0.1559*** 0.0666** 
Model Significance determined by Wald Chi Square statistic 
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***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
Table 3A: Effects of Institutional Form and Time on Racial and Economic Composition - GLS Regression Results  
  Dependent Variables 
  
Low-Income 
Enrollment 
Black 
Enrollment 
Hispanic 
Enrollment 
Underrepresented 
Minority Enrollment 
Asian 
Enrollment 
White 
Enrollment 
Independent 
Variables 
Flagship 
-9.4532*** -0.5513 0.9785 0.4299 6.838*** -7.2367* 
(2.3906) (1.3035) (1.0177) (1.963) (1.6923) (3.1017) 
Time 
0.2783 -0.1347 -0.0601 -0.2311 -0.0008 0.2207 
(0.2676) (0.1208) (0.1108) (0.22) (0.1217) (0.3339) 
Model 
Statistics 
r2 0.1658 0.0443 0.0223 0.0199 0.2355 0.0925 
Independent 
Variables 
Flagship 
-6.3234 0.4577 2.4805 0.9374 8.0318*** -11.147 
(4.9363) (2.3459) (2.0625) (4.0667) (2.5922) (6.2368) 
Time 
0.4783 -0.0706016 0.034 -0.1986 0.0739 -0.0249 
(0.3805) (0.1716) (0.1579) (0.3135) (0.1725) (0.476) 
Flagship*Time 
-0.3912 -0.1261 -0.1879 -0.0634 -0.1493 0.4891 
(0.5391) (0.2431) (0.2237) (0.4442) (0.2442) (0.6744) 
Model 
Statistics 
r2 0.1673 0.0301 0.0191 0.0177 0.2371 0.0843 
Model Significance determined by Wald Chi Square statistic 
***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
 
 
  
 
57 
  
  
 
58 
Table 3B: Effects of Institutional Form and Time on Racial and Economic Composition - GLS Regression Results  
 
  Dependent Variables 
  
Admissions 
Yield 
75th Percentile 
SAT Math 
75th Percentile 
SAT Verbal 
Application 
Fee 
In-State Tuition 
and Fees 
Independent 
Variables 
Flagship 
-15.7622*** 78.46*** 45.4163*** 12.7967*** 1624.669** 
(2.9347) (12.1199) (12.2815) (3.4722) (598.3883) 
Time 
0.429444 -0.402785 -0.4333 1.2177*** 81.8825 
(0.3367) (1.275) (1.305) (0.3821) (68.1844) 
Model Statistics r2 0.1896 0.4155 0.1837 0.124 0.0473 
       
Independent 
Variables 
Flagship 
-12.6361* 55.4249* 42.0063 13.01427 778.0927 
(6.1827) (23.9834) (24.3717) (7.0712) (1249.268) 
Time 
0.6225 -1.8324 -0.6539 1.2425* 30.22804 
(0.4793) (1.8195) (1.8543) (0.5428) (96.6905) 
Flagship*Time 
-0.3913 2.8826 0.4259 -0.0262 106.0189 
(0.6791) (2.5774) (2.6269) (0.769) (137.009) 
Model Statistics r2 0.1904 0.4037 0.181 0.1237 0.051 
Model Significance determined by Wald Chi Square statistic 
***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
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Table 4: Effect of Selectivity and Costs on Enrollments - GLS Regressions Results 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Low-Income 
Enrollment 
Black 
Enrollment 
Hispanic 
Enrollment 
Underrepresented 
Minority 
Enrollment 
Asian 
Enrollment 
White 
Enrollment 
Admissions Yield 0.0392** 0.0027 0.0315*** 0.0935*** 0.0078** -0.1007*** 
 (0.0144) (0.003) (0.0047) (0.0125) (0.0024) (0.0131) 
75th Percentile 
SAT Math -0.0706*** 0.0037 -0.0013 -0.0022 0.0023 -0.0045 
 (0.0125) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0108) (0.0021) (0.0114) 
75th Percentile 
SAT Verbal -0.0099 -0.0046* -0.0038 -0.0089 -0.0006 0.0069 
 (0.0109) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0094) (0.0018) (0.001) 
Application Fee -0.0099 -0.0068 -0.0287 -0.0727 -0.0044 0.0784* 
 (0.0109) (0.0085) (0.0118) (0.0338) (0.0066) (0.0358) 
In-State Tuition 
and Fees 0.0012*** 6.53E-06 0.0002*** 0.0004** -9.98E-06 -0.003** 
 (0.0001) (2.8E-05) (4.20E-05) (0.0001) (2.20E-05) (0.0001) 
Institutional Form -4.6239* -0.3916 1.8486*** 3.0068 6.913*** -9.4468*** 
 (2.1945) (-0.3916) (0.4381) (1.7900) (1.2052) (2.1817) 
Model Statistics       
Overall r2 0.5482 0.7102 0.7553 0.5014 0.6969 0.6547 
Model Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fixed effects for states not included 
***p=0.00, **p=0.01, *p=0.05 
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Table 5: Awareness of Isomorphic Pressures Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test Results for COPLAC Schools 
 
Question Yes No p-value 
Do any external organizations place pressures or demands on your university to increase student racial 
diversity? 
10 16 0.24 
Do any external organizations place pressures or demands on your university to increase rankings? 9 17 0.12 
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Table 6: Sources of Isomorphic Pressures Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test Results 
Question Variable Yes No p-value 
Do these sources 
influence your 
universities’ 
student racial 
diversity 
policies and 
practices? 
Mimetic 
Pressures Practices from aspirational peer universities 18 8 0.02 * 
Coercive 
Pressures 
State higher education system 12 14 0.54  
COPLAC 19 7 0.00 *** 
Normative 
Pressures 
COPLAC employees' previous employers 20 6 0.00 *** 
COPLAC employees' professional networks 17 9 0.03 * 
COPLAC employees educational training 17 9 0.03 * 
Do these sources 
influence your 
universities’ 
rankings 
policies and 
practices? 
Mimetic 
Pressures Practices from aspirational peer universities 19 7 0.01 ** 
Coercive 
Pressures 
State higher education system 6 20 0.03 * 
COPLAC 12 14 0.69  
Normative 
Pressures 
COPLAC employees' previous employers 18 8 0.03 * 
COPLAC employees' professional networks 16 10 0.03 * 
COPLAC employees educational training 14 12 0.16  
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Table 7: Impact of Each Source of Isomorphic Pressure Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test Results 
Question Variable 
Greatly 
Impacts 
Somewhat 
Impacts 
Barely 
Impacts 
p-value 
How much do 
these sources 
influence 
your 
universities’ 
student racial 
diversity 
policies and 
practices? 
Mimetic 
Pressures Practices from aspirational peer universities 1 14 4 0.01 ** 
Coercive 
Pressures 
State higher education system 2 10 4 0.04 * 
COPLAC 0 5 5 0.00 
**
* 
Normative 
Pressures 
COPLAC employees' previous employers 5 14 2 0.03 * 
COPLAC employees' professional networks 7 8 11 0.28  
COPLAC employees educational training 7 9 10 0.19  
How much do 
these sources 
influence 
your 
universities’ 
rankings 
policies and 
practices? 
Mimetic 
Pressures Practices from aspirational peer universities 5 12 2 0.05 * 
Coercive 
Pressures 
State higher education system 0 5 4 0.00 
**
* 
COPLAC 1 10 1 0.00 
**
* 
Normative 
Pressures 
COPLAC employees' previous employers 3 12 1 0.01 ** 
COPLAC employees' professional networks 1 11 3 0.01 ** 
COPLAC employees educational training 0 11 3 0.00 
**
* 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Original IPEDS Variables 
Admissions and Test Scores Construct Values Years Available 
Applicants Total Selectivity/IV Continuous Number 2001 to 2015 
Admissions Total Selectivity/IV Continuous Number 2001 to 2015 
Percent of Accepted Applicants Selectivity/IV Continuous Percent 2006 to 2015 
SAT Critical Reading 75th Percentile Selectivity/IV Continuous Score  2001 to 2015 
SAT Math 75th Percentile Selectivity/IV Continuous Score  2001 to 2015 
ACT English 75th Percentile Selectivity/IV Continuous Score  2001 to 2015 
ACT Math 75th Percentile Selectivity/IV Continuous Score  2001 to 2015 
Student Charges  Values Years Available 
Application Fee Cost of Attendance/Control Continuous Dollar Amount 1987 to 2015 
In-state Tuition and Fees Cost of Attendance/Control Continuous Dollar Amount 1996 to 2015 
Student Financial Aid and Net Price  Values Years Available 
Percent of FTFT Students receiving federal grant 
aid, including Pell 
Diversity/DV Continuous Percent 1998 to 2015 
Fall Enrollment Construct Values Years Available 
Total Enrolled Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
American Indian of Alaska Native Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
Asian, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
Black or African American Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
Hispanic Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
White Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
Two or More or Unknown Races Diversity/DV Continuous Number 1984; '86; '88-2015 
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument 
Q1. Which of the following influence your university’s methods for increasing student racial 
diversity? (Check all that apply) 
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Q2. Which of the following influence your university’s methods for increasing ranking? (Check 
all that apply) 
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Q3. How important are students’ SAT or ACT scores in admission decisions? 
 
Q4. Do any external organizations (such as COPLAC, the state higher education system’s 
governing body, ranking agencies, etc) place any pressures or demands on your university to 
increase student racial diversity or university ranking? 
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Appendix C: Original Survey Instrument  
Pressures on COPLAC Universities (Qualtrics Word Output) 
(Formatting varies from what respondents see in Qualtrics) 
 
Pressures on COPLAC Universities 
 
Q1 What is your position at your university? 
 Admissions Director 
 Enrollment Management Director 
 Other (specify) ____________________ 
 
Q2 How long have you worked at this university? 
 Less than 1 year 
 Less than 2 years 
 Less than 3 years 
 Less than 5 years 
 Less than 10 years 
 More than 10 years 
 
Q3 Select all of the races/ethnicities that apply to you. 
 White or Caucasian 
 Black or African American 
 Latinx 
 Native American or Alaska Native 
 Asian 
 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
 Other (specify) ____________________ 
 
Q4 What is your gender? 
 Woman 
 Man 
 Other (specify) ____________________ 
 
Q5 Name one institution that your university considered a comparative peer institution prior to becoming 
a member of COPLAC. 
 
Q6 Name one public institution that your university currently considers an aspirational peer. 
 
Q7 Name one private institution that your university currently considers an aspirational peer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
68 
Q8 Rank the following goals by level of importance to your university, with 1 being the most important 
and 5 being the least important. (Drag and Drop) 
______ Increasing Campus Resources (tutoring services, library collections, recreational spaces, etc) 
______ Increasing University Ranking 
______ Increasing Graduation Rates 
______ Increasing Student Racial Diversity 
______ Increasing Funding for the University 
 
Q9 How would you rate the student racial diversity of your university compared to other universities in 
your state? 
 More diverse than other universities in my state 
 Equal level of diversity compared to other universities in my state 
 Less diverse than other universities in my state 
 
Q10 How important is increasing student racial diversity to your university? 
 Extremely important 
 Very important 
 Moderately important 
 Slightly important 
 Not at all important 
 
Q11 What are the reasons that your university aims to increase student racial diversity? 
 
Q12 Does your university have policies, programs, or practices in place to increase student racial 
diversity? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q13 Describe these policies, programs, or practices. (Open Response) 
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Q14 Which of the following influence your university's methods for increasing student racial diversity? 
(Check all that apply) 
 
Do any of the methods used by 
your university to increase 
student racial diversity come 
from this source? 
If yes, how much does this source impact the 
methods used by your university to increase 
student racial diversity? 
 Yes No 
Greatly 
Impacts 
Somewhat 
Impacts 
Barely 
Impacts 
Practices from 
aspirational 
peer 
universities 
          
Suggestions 
from the state 
higher 
education 
system's 
governing 
body 
          
Suggestions 
from COPLAC 
          
Practices from 
universities at 
which faculty 
and staff were 
previously 
employed 
          
Practices 
suggested by 
faculty and 
staff's 
professional 
organizations 
          
Practices 
faculty and 
staff learned 
during their 
educational 
training 
          
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Q15 Is there a conflict between increasing university ranking and increasing student racial diversity at 
your university? 
 Definitely yes 
 Probably yes 
 Might or might not 
 Probably not 
 Definitely not 
 
Q16 How does your university balance the need to increase university ranking and increase student racial 
diversity? 
 
Q17 How important is increasing university ranking to your university? 
 Extremely important 
 Very important 
 Moderately important 
 Slightly important 
 Not at all important 
 
Q18 What are the reasons that your university aims to increase its ranking? (Open Response) 
 
 
Q19 What methods does your university employ to increase its ranking? (Open Response) 
 
  
 
71 
  
Q20 Which of the following influence your university's methods for increasing its ranking? (Check all 
that apply) 
 
Do any of the methods used by 
your university to increase its 
ranking come from this source? 
If yes, how much does this source impact the 
methods used by your university to increase its 
ranking? 
 Yes No 
Greatly 
Impacts 
Somewhat 
Impacts 
Barely 
Impacts 
Practices from 
aspirational 
peer 
universities 
          
Suggestions 
from the state 
higher 
education 
system's 
governing 
body 
          
Suggestions 
from COPLAC 
          
Practices from 
universities at 
which faculty 
and staff were 
previously 
employed 
          
Practices 
suggested by 
faculty and 
staff's 
professional 
organizations 
          
Practices 
faculty and 
staff learned 
during their 
educational 
training 
          
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Q21 How important are students' SAT or ACT scores in admissions decisions? 
 Extremely important 
 Very important 
 Moderately important 
 Slightly important 
 Not at all important 
 
Q22 Does your university submit information about incoming students' SAT or ACT scores to ranking 
agencies, such as US News & World Report? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q23 Does your university associate increasing average SAT and ACT scores of incoming students with 
increasing university ranking? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q24 Do any external organizations (such as COPLAC, the state higher education system's governing 
body, ranking agencies, etc) place any pressures or demands on your university to increase student racial 
diversity or university ranking? 
 
Do external organizations place pressures or demands on your 
university 
 Yes No 
Increase student racial diversity     
Increase university ranking     
 
 
Q25 How do those organizations communicate their desires to your university? 
 
Q26 What are the consequences of failing to meet the demands of these organization for your university? 
 
Q27 Is there currently a model for a highly ranked and highly racially diverse public liberal arts 
university. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q28 List the universities you identify as highly ranked and highly racially diverse. (Open Response) 
 
 
 
